

THE REPUBLICAN TRADITION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In its broad and general formulation as it developed in the eighteenth century, the republican tradition in Europe stood for a specific but loosely defined cluster of values: the ideals of public virtue or public spirit, civic involvement, dedication to the common good, active participation in the affairs of the commonwealth, deliberation with one's peers, political equality, liberty understood as independence.¹⁵⁵ By the middle of the nineteenth century this dynamic tradition was deeply entrenched in European political culture; republican ideas had also played a defining role in the American struggle for independence.¹⁵⁶

The French Revolution of 1789 had given the republican idea a powerful impetus, and its notions of individualism, constitutionalism, patriotism, citizenship, and the nation-in-arms exercised a powerful appeal for the European imagination during much of the nineteenth century.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ 'Kosciuszko's Act of Insurrection, in Cracow, March 24, 1794', 132.

¹⁵⁵ On the development of republican thought and themes before the eighteenth century, see, for example Gisela Bock and Q. Skinner (eds.), *Machiavelli and Republicanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Peltonen, *Classical Humanism in English Political Thought from 1570 to 1640 with Special Reference to Classical Republicanism* (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1991), i, ii. On America see John Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment*; P. Higonnet's *Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); D. Lacorne, *L'Invention de la république: le modèle américain* (Paris: Hachette, 1991); and J. Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

¹⁵⁶ For an overview see Franco Venturi's marvellous volumes on Europe (and republicanism) during the Enlightenment: *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment; Settecento riformatore (The End of the Old Regime in Europe), 1768-1776* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), and *Caduta dell'Antico Regime (The End of the Old Regime in Europe), 1776-1789* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), i, ii. On America see John Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment*; P. Higonnet's *Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); D. Lacorne, *L'Invention de la république: le modèle américain* (Paris: Hachette, 1991); and J. Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

¹⁵⁷ J. Godechot, *La Grande Nation: l'expansion révolutionnaire de la France dans le monde de 1789 à 1799* (Paris: Aubier, 1983); Colloque de Belfort, *L'Idée de nation et l'idée de citoyenneté en France et dans les pays de langue allemande sous la Révolution* (Belfort: Université de Belfort, 1989); Société des Études Robespierriennes, *Colloque révolution et*

Yet for republicans in continental Europe fighting against the Holy Empire in the early nineteenth century, the cases of Corsica, Poland, and America (as well as some of the more classical republican images), provided appealing and more practical examples from which to draw inspiration.¹⁵⁸ In France, where the republican tradition was given a complex theoretical articulation, republicans were a polymorphous community, held together by an attachment to powerful principles and common historical experiences.¹⁵⁹ Although French republicans celebrated the Revolution, the principles of popular sovereignty and patriotism, the necessity of political freedoms and mass education, and the centrality of law, there were frequent and often acrimonious divisions over the definition and ordering of their core values.¹⁶⁰ This disunity was reflected in the French republican approach to questions of war and peace.

During the nineteenth century, French republicans were at various moments tempted by aggressive and expansionist nationalism, pacifism, and even radical cosmopolitanism.¹⁶¹ But none of these doctrines resented the true defensive manifestation of the republican philosophy of war, as outlined earlier in this chapter. As will be seen, this defensive tradition was instead mainly articulated by Polish and Italian republi-

républicain, l'exception française (Paris: IHRF, 1994); G. Best, *The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and its Legacy* (London: Fontana, 1988).

¹⁵⁸ For a general history of the broad insurrectionary movement in nineteenth-century Europe (including both the republican and more radical strands), see Geoffrey Best's chapters 'The Insurgent Underground' and 'People's Wars of National Liberation', in *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe 1770-1870* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982), 252-64, 265-72, and R. F. Leslie's *The Age of Transformation* (London: Blandford Press, 1964).

¹⁵⁹ Notable studies include Claude Nicolet's *L'Idée républicaine en France* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982); François Furet, *La Gauche et la révolution au milieu du XIX^e siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1986), and especially Tchernoff's exceptional two volumes: *Le Parti Républicain sous la monarchie de juillet: formation et évolution de la doctrine républicaine* (Paris: Pedone, 1901) and *Le Parti Républicain au coup d'état et sous le Second Empire* (Paris: Pedone, 1906), and also G. Weill's *Histoire du Parti Républicain en France* (Paris: Alcan, 1900).

¹⁶⁰ For a sense of the continuing importance of these themes in nineteenth-century French republicanism, see F. Furet and M. Ozouf (eds.), *Le Siècle de l'avènement républicain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993); S. K. Hazareesingh *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); R. Alexander, 'Restoration Republicanism Reconsidered', *French History* (Dec. 1994), 442-69; P. Pilbeam, *Republicanism in 19th Century France* (London: Macmillan, 1995); Philip Nord, *The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in 19th Century France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

¹⁶¹ Godechot's *La Grande Nation*, 211-32, is invaluable on expansive republicanism. For examples of republican 'anti-patriotism' see G. Hervé's *Leur patrie* (Paris: Librairie de Propagande Socialiste, 1906) and Larulot, *L'Idole Patrie et ses conséquences* (Brochure Datée de la Prison de Valenciennes, 15 May 1907).

cans from the early decades of nineteenth century.¹⁶² Their French counterparts only fully embraced this doctrine after the impact of the Franco-Prussian War; it had become the mainstream republican view of war in France by 1914.¹⁶³ But if France did not provide the intellectual cradle for this doctrine, it certainly provided a more practical refuge for European republican insurrection: Polish and Italian exiles escaping persecution from their Empire's police and military forces met on French soil, and there began the process of organizing republican insurrection.

The determining moment for the construction of republics is traditionally seen as 1848, the 'Springtime of Nations'.¹⁶⁴ However, it will emerge that a particular event in the early 1830s which collected a small group of (largely) anonymous young men together was decisive in the founding of defensive republican war. They embarked on a project which was to have strong social and political ramifications for the development of the tradition of war in the nineteenth century, and indeed for modern republicanism in general. This project was a *Carbonari*-organized military expedition to liberate the Savoie, and included republican Germans as well as Poles, Italians, and a Scandinavian.¹⁶⁵ Although the attempt ended in failure, the people who had participated in the campaign had succeeded in creating something manifestly original, but that nonetheless drew on late eighteenth-century republican war in several ways. They forged a new set of principles which were to underpin the way in which republican war was waged in Europe for the rest of the century, both mirroring and enhancing the paradigm of three founders outlined earlier in this chapter.

¹⁶² Italian republicans were articulating this philosophy from the 1820s. See L. Migliorini, 'L'Héroïsme militaire dans l'Italie après Napoléon', in Viallaneix and Ehrard, *La Bataille, l'armée, la gloire 1745-1871*, especially 497-8.

¹⁶³ Jules Michelet, *France et Français: Textes patriotiques* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1893), 160. The ideological evolution of socialists such as Jaurès was particularly critical; see for example his article on 'patriotism' in *Revue de Paris*, 1 Dec. 1898. More generally, G. Goyau's *L'idée de patrie et l'humanitarisme: essai d'histoire française 1866-1901* (Paris: Perrin, 1902).

¹⁶⁴ Peter Stearns, *The Revolutions of 1848* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974), and the more recent Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

¹⁶⁵ A general account of the expedition is given in E. E. Y. Hale, *Mazzini and the Secret Societies: The Making of a Myth* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956), ch. 6 (which is almost exclusively based on Harro Harring's account); Paul Harro Harring, *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie et sur les derniers événements de Savoie par un témoin oculaire ou mémoires d'un rebelle*, part I (Paris: Librairie M. Déroivaux, 1834), part II (Dijon: Imprimerie de Mme. Veuve Brugnot, 1834); see also Mazzini's version in his *Life and Writings of Mazzini*, 340-68.

As it developed in the nineteenth century, the republican tradition of war grew into two separate but on occasion overlapping branches; one defensive, one expansive. The defensive tradition was committed to preserving and building democratic republican institutions based on distinct nation states. The expansive tradition, however, focused almost exclusively on the projection of republican power through force. Each of these schools understood the concept of equality and fraternity in a different manner, leading to contrasting formulations in their structure, shape, and ideological development. The expansive branch drew on a different interpretation and image of Jean Jacques Rousseau from the version presented here. This difference was caused by its reliance on different works and also its emphasis on particular notions (as typically found in the representation of Rousseau by individuals such as Filipe Buonarroti).¹⁶⁶ The expansive tradition neither drew upon the other two founders of the defensive tradition, Pasquale Paoli and Tadeusz Kosciuszko for inspiration, nor on the predicaments of their nations for examples to learn from or emulate. It also did not associate views on republican war with Rousseau's work on war. Rather it drew almost exclusively from the principles and events of the French Revolution, and their interpretation of it. These differences, although often minor, emphasized quite distinct notions—and purposes—of patriotism for the republican tradition of war, as well as more generally for wars of national liberation. The unity and diversity of this broader tradition of war will be outlined at the end of this chapter, but it will be the nineteenth-century defensive tradition that will be traced in the following section, beginning with an introduction to key individuals, all of whom took part in the intellectual birth of Young Europe in Berne in 1834.

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY REPUBLICAN TRADITION OF WAR

There were a number of central personalities in the development of the republican tradition of war in Europe but, as mentioned above, the main figures of the tradition to be examined in the first half of the nineteenth century were Polish and Italian. The nature of Polish exile had provoked involvement in other republican causes in Europe, and, under Napoleon, the Poles fought for France and for an expansive republican dream which could evoke (if not actually bring back) their lost

¹⁶⁶ See Eisenstein, Filippo Michele Buonarroti, *The First Professional Revolutionist*.

homeland. But there were Poles that did not look to France for salvation. One such was a young captain who led one of the exile columns out of Poland after the suppression of the long insurrection of 1830–1, Karol Bogul Stolzman. He had been part of the famous defence of the capital, and had clearly assumed a pivotal role since his name was on the short list of wanted 'criminals' who were tried in *absentia*.¹⁶⁷ The work of Polish military theorists who had participated in the Polish insurrection of 1830–1 were much studied in Europe throughout the nineteenth century,¹⁶⁸ and none more so than the military manual of this young republican officer, first published in 1844.¹⁶⁹ His own participation in the expedition to liberate the Savoie as a *Carbonaro*, and to forge the principles of Young Europe and Young Poland represented a decisive break from the expansive republican revolutionary movements many Poles preferred, in favour of the defensive republican paradigm. 'Young Poland' was the inspiration for other republican Polish groups planning yet more insurrections in exile, such as the 'Association of Polish People' in Paris and London, and the 'Confederation of the Polish Nation', which united with Young Poland in 1836. Along with other members of the Polish Democratic Society in Paris, Stolzman was clearly influenced by Rousseauian republican ideals.¹⁷⁰ Lesnodorski writes of the 'interest carried for the thought of J. J. Rousseau' by the Poles who had emigrated to France after the failure of the 1830–1 uprising, 'above all by the members of the Polish Democratic Society,

¹⁶⁷ A short biography of Stolzman is Bolesław Limanowski, 'Karol Bogumil Stolzman: Steadfast Patriot and Partisan from 1831–1848', in *Szermierze Wolności* (Warsaw, 1911).

¹⁶⁸ The works of L. Bystrzonowski, *Notice sur le réseau stratégique de la Pologne, pour servir à une guerre des partisans* (Paris: Bourgogne et Martinet, 1842), W. Chrzanowski, *Sur la guerre des partisans* (Paris: Imp. de Pinard, 1835), and Pradzynski, *Mémoire historique et militaire sur la guerre en Pologne en 1831* (Paris: Nien, 1840) were known in the West and in Russia. These were all translated into foreign languages and used by military writers and theorists in France and Italy.

¹⁶⁹ K. Stolzman, *Partisan Warfare: The Warfare Most Appropriate to Insurgent Nations, Parzyantka czyli wojna dla ludów powstających najwalcowsza*, ed. A. Anusiewicz (Warsaw: Wydawn. Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1959), 2nd edition. Stolzman's 'remarkable' treatise is acknowledged as having an impact well into the twentieth century. W. Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977), 115. Halicz states that Stolzman's manual was among the most widely read books in Poland during the years 1840–60, and that future generations were 'brought up on it': *Partisan Warfare in 19th Century Poland*, 100.

¹⁷⁰ On Rousseau's powerful influence on Polish insurrectionary thought see J. Fabre, *Stanislas-Auguste Poratowski et l'Europe des lumières* (Paris: Éditions Orphys, 1951); both B. Lesnodorski's 'Les Jacobins polonais', and his 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau vu de Pologne'; M. Tomaszewski, 'Rousseau, éducation des Polonais', *Rousseau, l'Émile et la Révolution*, Actes du Colloque International de Montmorency 1989 (Paris: Robert Thiéry, 1992).

founded in Paris in 1832 who relied upon Rousseau's theories'. One such member, Joseph Wiende, translated a new edition of *Social Contract* in 1839, which was re-edited and reissued in both 1860 and 1862 in Polish, on the 'eve of the Insurrection of 1863'.¹⁷¹

The other founder of 'Young Europe' was Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–72), who adapted Kosciuszko's theories to embrace the central platform of the republican tradition of war.¹⁷² As with most republicans of the era, Mazzini was driven by the ambition of overturning the 1815 Vienna settlement, which had divided Italy, Hungary, and Poland among the Austrian, German, and Russian empires. Mazzini's acknowledged mentor in these early years was Carlo Bianco, Conte Di Saint-Jorioz (1795–1843), a former law student and Piedmontese officer who, after 1821, took part in the Italian, Spanish, and Greek insurrections. Bianco was the military chief of staff of the *Carbonari*. His two-volume masterpiece, published in 1830 on the subject of uprisings, entitled *Della Guerra Nazionale d'Insurrezione per Bande applicata all'Italia*, was drawn directly from Kosciuszko's work, *Can the Poles Fight Their Way to Freedom?*¹⁷³ Through joining Bianco's smaller society, the *Apofasimeni*, of which Buonarrotti was a member, Mazzini became initiated into one of the most secret of all revolutionary movements of Europe. After 1831 he published a short paper based entirely on Saint-Jorioz's book entitled: *La Giovine Italia* (Young Italy).¹⁷⁴ Mazzini was to become the central exponent of the ideology of insurrectionary and partisan war as the most useful method of constructing democratic republics, providing intellectual, moral, military, and material support for Polish, Hungarian, and French republicans.¹⁷⁵ Besides Carlo Bianco, Mazzini had close links with Stolzman and the Danish republican Harro Harring: all had been members of the *Carbonari*, the secret society opposed to the Vienna settlement; all had also rebelled against its secrecy and institu-

¹⁷¹ Lesnodorski, 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau vu de Pologne', 34.

¹⁷² For an account of the post-expedition Mazzini see Dennis Mack Smith's engaging *Mazzini* (London: Yale University Press, 1994); for a different, younger Mazzini see Hale's *Mazzini and the Secret Societies*.

¹⁷³ C. Bianco, *Della Guerra Nazionale d'Insurrezione per Bande applicata all'Italia: Trattato Dedicato ai Buoni Italiani da un Amico del Paese*, Marseilles, 2 vols. See Piero Pieri's 'Carlo Bianco Conte di Saint Jorioz e il suo trattato sulla guerra partigiana', chapter 4 of his *Storia militare del Risorgimento; guerre e insurrezioni*, Biblioteca di cultura storica, 71 (Torino: Einaudi, 1962), 104–29.

¹⁷⁴ *Life and Writings*, i, 58–65. A contemporary portrait of Bianco can be found in Harro Harring's work, especially at 28–9.

¹⁷⁵ See Stefan Kieniewicz's 'La Pensée de Mazzini et le mouvement national slave', *Atti del Convegno sul tema Mazzini e l'Europa* (Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1974), especially 115–19.

tional hierarchy.¹⁷⁶ Harro Harring had joined in the Philhellene Brigade to fight for Greek liberation before joining the Poles in their struggle against the Russians in 1830. He had founded several underground republican newspapers in Germany and elsewhere, written several books, and was a crucial member of the exiles' group. All took part in a plan to liberate the Savoie from tyranny through military insurrection in 1833.¹⁷⁷

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLICAN TRADITION OF WAR

Paoli and Kosciuszko, when facing the Genoese Republic and the combined forces of the Russian, German, and Austrian empires, described their predicament as a struggle against foreign tyranny and slavery. As seen earlier in the chapter, this was also how J. J. Rousseau depicted the enemy. However, the men who had embarked on the construction of republics in the 1830s saw themselves facing not only foreign forces but also fighting against what they perceived as less ethical attempts to overthrow empire. Thus the members of the Young Italy expedition broke away from their backers, the *Carbonari*, whilst at the same time attempting to complete their mission of insurrection in the Savoie. Mazzini complained of Carbonarism's 'fatal tendency to seek its chiefs in the highest spheres of society rather as the business of the superior classes than as the duty of the people, sole creators of great revolutions'. Although he and his friends were fighting for a republican vision, 'Carbonarism had no such principle. Its only weapon was mere negation. It called upon men to overthrow: it did not teach them how to build up a new edifice upon the ruins of the old'.¹⁷⁸ Harro Harring's memoirs are full of accounts of the high farce and the low treachery of these secret organizations, which he believed helped rather than hindered the cause of empire.¹⁷⁹ However, it was their cosmopolitanism which he believed was

¹⁷⁶ See Alessandro Luzio, *Giuseppe Mazzini, carbonaro: nuovi documenti degli archivi di Milano e Torino* (Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1920), and more generally, Giuseppe Leti's *Carboneria e massoneria nel Risorgimento italiano* (Bologna: A. Forni, 1966).

¹⁷⁷ A short account of the extraordinary life of Harro Harring can be found in the preface of a collection of his watercolours of South American slaves done in the 1840s, and reprinted by the Brazilian government: P. Harro Harring, *Tropical Sketches* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1965), drawn largely from the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*.

¹⁷⁸ *Life and Writings*, i. 68-9.

¹⁷⁹ For a fascinating account of only a fraction of Buonarroti's activities see Julien Kuypers, *Les Égalitaires en Belgique: Buonarroti et les sociétés secrètes d'après des docu-*

the most dangerous feature of their ideology. He also did not hesitate to denounce all 'despots and their filthy satellites who encircle them'.¹⁸⁰

Thus, although this later generation saw itself as carrying out the struggle on two fronts, there were striking continuities between the ideology of the nineteenth-century republican tradition of war and that of the founders of the tradition in the late eighteenth century. The historical context they used to explore answers to their predicament was similar. Writing on the failure of the 1830 insurrection, Stolzman evoked Kosciuszko's writings on the failure of 1794, in using examples from other nations facing stronger enemies than Poland herself: 'was the servitude of the Spaniards more dreadful, the yoke which oppressed them more cruel than that which crushed us before the Insurrection of November 29th?', and added, 'was the love of freedom and the desire for it more widespread, more diffused' among all 'classes of the inhabitants than here?'¹⁸¹ A little later he quoted Kosciuszko's *Can the Poles Fight Their Way to Freedom?*: 'whoever thinks to start a revolution without the rights of freedom and equality, wishes to spill the blood of his fellow brothers in vain. And, moreover, why begin the struggle not having as the goal the happiness of all?'¹⁸² 'He who has fought more than once for the cause of humanity', wrote Harro Harring after the failure of the expedition, 'will not weaken in his personal conviction'. Just because the 'enemies of the human race have managed to impede the open struggle for liberty and the rights of nations, having understood the goal of existence and the laws of progress', such a person could only 'take more strength and courage after these obstructions; it proves that a deeper hatred of his enemies' cause can strengthen his love for humanity and make it both more powerful and more profound'.¹⁸³ Stolzman, in a Swiss prison with other Polish exiles after the failure of the insurrection, published an appeal on their behalf addressed to the people of the canton of Vaud, and to the members of its *conseil d'état*. In it, he described their collective nature in an image that recalled

ment inédits 1824-1836 (Brussels: Librairie Encyclopédique, 1960); and (for the period from the French Revolution up until the year before the expedition) the seminal article by A. Lehning 'Buonarroti and His International Secret Societies', *International Review*, 1 (1956), 112-40. For the first expedition to liberate the Savoie, partially organized by Buonarroti, see F. Rude's 'La Première Expédition de Savoie', *Revue historique*, 189 (1940), 413-43.

¹⁸⁰ 'I pointed out the comic and ridiculous nature of such a committee, and declared that I should be ashamed to submit to such a crass dictatorship... who are so inflated that they are better known to our enemies than they are to themselves'. *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, ii. 10, 4.

¹⁸¹ *Partisan warfare*, xvii.

¹⁸² *Ibid.* xxiv. ¹⁸³ *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, ii. 4.

Rousseau, Paoli, and Kosciuszko: 'We declare, before the Being who has created men equal and free on all the earth, that we... children of misfortune, errant and fugitives of the earth, rebuffed by all governments, attach no more of a price on our life than that it could serve towards the emancipation of oppressed peoples'.¹⁸⁴

Thus, as can be seen, the centrality of the core values of liberty, equality, and fraternity remained. Unlike other political groups who sought to advance national struggles in nineteenth-century Europe, the republican tradition viewed these principles as indissociable. The 'Young Italy' organization went further. Its members also developed a sophisticated view of republicanism as a complex combination of thought, action, principle, and sentiment. So the 'General Instructions for the Members of Young Italy' started with listing the following principles (before going on to develop them in depth): 'Liberty, Equality, Humanity, Independence, Unity'.¹⁸⁵ As Young Italy's epigram, the way in which these principles could be achieved, Mazzini declared, was if one recognized 'the duty and necessity of harmonizing thought and action'.¹⁸⁶ These principles must be affiliated because, as Mazzini declared: 'Merely to shout liberty, without reflecting what is intended the word should imply, is the instinct of the oppressed slave—no more'.¹⁸⁷ Indeed, republicanism, for Harro Harring, was everything: 'I am *Republican* in the most sacred intent of the word... I am a rebel, an insurrectionary.' Just as Paoli had celebrated being cast as a 'rebel' by the Genoese, both as proof of his legitimate representation of his people and as a fighter against tyranny; so, too, Harro Harring defined rebellion as a metaphor for this republican philosophy. In his account of the expedition, *Jeune Italie*, subtitled *Memoirs of a Rebel* he asks:

What is a rebel? A Man whose heart revolts against injustice and lies, the prerogatives of birth, and against favour by the grace of God. A Man whose heart burns for justice and truth, for virtue and for liberty, who is ready to sacrifice, for humanity, his goods, his blood, and his life. A man who takes up arms to defend the honour of his *patrie*, and who prefers death to slavery: There! That is what a rebel is!¹⁸⁸

Marion Kubalski, another Polish member of the expedition both paraphrased and cited Rousseau in the frontispiece of his *Mémoires* by con-

¹⁸⁴ *Europe centrale*, 18 Feb. 1834.

¹⁸⁵ *Life and Writings*, i. 96. 'Unity' carried an instrumental rather than philosophical significance, and was in the main countering Sismondi's then popular theory of federalism for Italy; *ibid.* 43.

¹⁸⁶ *Life and Writings*, i. 65.

¹⁸⁷ *Life and Writings*, i. 157.

¹⁸⁸ *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, iii. 2.

trasting the combined notions of liberty and democracy with those of slavery and peace: 'An eloquent and profound voice' who seems to be 'speaking to his own *patrie* tells us: it is, above all, for a democratic and popular government that the citizen needs to arm himself; with strength and constancy', and in 'such a manner that he may write every day of his life "I much prefer a perilous liberty to a tranquil slavery"'. J. J. Rousseau, *Contrat Social*, III, IV.¹⁸⁹ Young Italy's commitment was to action, its epigraph: '*Ora e sempre, Fais ce que dois, advienne que pourra*'. This action was entirely republican. Mazzini's declared method to achieve republicanism was through education, but this was to be done by affiliating education to the notion of liberty; insurrection and education were thus fused in a unified approach: 'my idea of an association', was 'one calculated to serve an educational as well as insurrectional purpose'. Thus the 'means by which Young Italy proposes to reach its aim are: education and insurrection, to be adopted simultaneously, and made to harmonize with each other'. Education must 'ever be directed to teach by example, word, and pen, the necessity of insurrection'. Insurrection, on the other hand, 'whenever it can be realised, must be so conducted as to render it a means of national education'.¹⁹⁰

Ultimately drawing on the earlier paradigm, the main formulators of the nineteenth-century tradition argued that self-reliance and self-respect were key aspects of a successful insurrection for national freedom.¹⁹¹ As noted above, Kosciuszko was the first to argue this, although it made him extremely unpopular in Polish circles devoted to Napoleon, with royalist clans playing power politics between the diplomats of the empires of Austria and Russia, and with the more radical European groups like the *Carbonari* who believed the purpose of social revolution was to create a cosmopolitan, supra-national Europe.¹⁹² Harro Harring complained about the Carbonari's attempt to 'involve itself arrogantly in the affairs of a foreign nation', and that, 'on the contrary, patriots being on the interior of an oppressed country always know better which were the means and the opportunities towards

¹⁸⁹ *Mémoires sur l'expédition des réfugiés polonais en Suisse et en Savoie dans les années 1833-4* (Paris: Merle Imp. P. Baudoin, 1836), i.

¹⁹⁰ *Life and Writings*, i. 155. 'Now and Forever, do what you must, come what may'; *ibid.* 65, 106.

¹⁹¹ B. Negroni, 'Introduction', *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne* (Paris: Flammarion, 1990), 33-50.

¹⁹² For a detailed account of the diplomatic role the remnants of the Polish court played in Paris, see M. Dziewanowski, '1848 and the Hotel Lambert', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 26 (1948).

emancipation'.¹⁹³ Stolzman also made this principle the credo of a successful partisan war: 'in order to complete this sacred mission, one must have faith in one's own strength, not depend on others and not count on external factors'. He appealed 'to our fellow countrymen: do not look to the French because they have no need as urgent and as sacred as ours to rise in arms'.¹⁹⁴ Young Italy was based on the idea that 'Italy is strong enough to free herself without external help'.¹⁹⁵

Yet this self-reliance did not imply a lack of concern for others struggling for the same goals: as illustrated above, it was a core feature of republican internationalism to volunteer to help any other nation facing a similar predicament. The fraternal principles of Young Europe were explained as an association of 'all the peoples, and of all free men in one mission of progress embracing the whole of HUMANITY'.¹⁹⁶ Stolzman's *Partisan Warfare* was dedicated to his companions of the 1830 insurrection, 'my countrymen who first gave the call to national insurrection' and had on the frontispiece a combination of Adam Mickiewicz's motto of 'together young friends', and Kilinski's words: 'we took God as our aid and began immediately the search for friends to embark on our enterprise'.¹⁹⁷ The fraternity was 'even extended, as in Paoli's and Kosciuszko's political thought, to the enemy. The slogan under which Stolzman fought in Warsaw was a reversal of two words of Kosciuszko's slogan to the Russians 'for both our freedom and yours'; it had become, a generation later: 'for your freedom and ours'.¹⁹⁸ Mazzini also attempted to distinguish the political nature of the conflicts between peoples and states: 'the oppressed is not, whatever one says, the natural ally of the enemies of his master... one ought not to confuse the love of liberty with sentiments of hatred and vengeance'.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹³ Haring, *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, ii, 9.

¹⁹⁵ Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, iii, 107.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. i, 165.

¹⁹⁷ *Partisan Warfare*.

On this fraternalism (both within and across national movements) in the 1830s, see Kenneth F. Lewalski's 'Fraternal Politics: Polish and European Radicalism during the Great Emigration', in *Polish Democratic Thought, from the Renaissance to the Great Emigration: Essays and Documents* (London: East European Monographs, 1990), 93–108.

¹⁹⁸ This was adopted as the slogan of the resistance when facing the Russians, as advanced by the historian Joachim Lelewel, one of the leaders of the insurrection (whose younger brother was later to go on the expedition under Stolzman's command). See Skurnowicz, *Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism: Joachim Lelewel and the Polish National Idea*, 74. See also K. Olszewski, *For Your Freedom and Ours: Polish Progressive Spirit from the 14th Century to the Present* (New York: New York University Press, 1981).

¹⁹⁹ G. Mazzini, *Lettre à M. Léon Plée sur la question européenne* ('L'Europe entière sera libre ou cosaque') (Geneva: A. Brasset et Cie., 1857), 2.

All republicans within this tradition of war also shared a common understanding of just and unjust war, and the methods to wage it. In 'Young Italy', Mazzini himself declares: 'Insurrection—by means of guerrilla bands—is the true method of warfare for all nations desirous of emancipating themselves from a foreign yoke.' Guerrilla warfare was 'invincible, indestructible'. Their programme argued that popular uprisings and partisan warfare were legitimate methods for achieving republican goals. Thus, in Mazzini's *Rules for the Conduct of Guerrilla Bands*, modelled on Bianco's earlier work, the role of insurrectionary war had to be distinguished from its goal: the 'political mission of [guerrilla] bands is to constitute the armed apostate of the insurrection... Guerrilla bands are the precursors of the nation, and endeavour to rouse the nation to insurrection. They have 'no right' to 'substitute themselves for the nation'.²⁰⁰ Carlo Bianco argued that insurrectionary war was a war of people against 'one or more professional armies. At such a time every Italian who loves his country and is brave of heart will pursue the barbarian oppressors'.²⁰¹ Bianco's own work was shown to rely on Kosciuszko's in many parts, referring often to the 1794 uprising and *Can the Poles Fight their Way to Freedom?*, although believing that Kosciuszko's last battle was strategically mistaken and that he should have transformed the nature of the struggle into partisan warfare.²⁰² Stolzman believed that a partisan war was the means to republican goals: 'Guerrilla warfare causes minds to adapt themselves to independence and to an active and heroic life; it makes nations great'.²⁰³ Like Rousseau, Harro Harring thought professional soldiers the worst type of criminal: 'the word soldier is an infamous one, by its very etymology "sold" which indicates payment and a bought creature'. This word ought to be 'erased forever from our Dictionary, or at least used with more circumspection'. He thus described himself a 'trooper-citizen', as an exile in the fifth company of the 'Polish republic'.²⁰⁴

As noted in Rousseau's paradigm of the republic at war, the main generator of self-defence was the culture of patriotism, which, through education, encouraged a sense of duty towards the republic. As in Rousseau's formulation, this education was primarily sentimental. The

²⁰⁰ *Life and Writings*, i, Appendix; iii, 109. An assessment of the extent of Mazzini's debt to Bianco can be found in Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, 129–30.

²⁰¹ Carlo Bianco di Saint-Jorioz, *Ai Militari Italiani* (1833) (Torino: Comitato di Torino dell' Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento Italiano, 1975), 25.

²⁰² In M. Kukiel's review of Piero Pieri's 'Carlo Bianco Conte di Saint Jorioz e il suo trattato' in *Teki Historyczne*, 59 (1958), he compares the two works in some detail.

²⁰³ *Partisan Warfare*, 20. ²⁰⁴ *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, i, 7–8.

central concern of defensive republicans was the need to involve the entire populace in resistance through their political identification with *la patrie*. Mazzini explained Young Italy's organization as contrasted with that of the Carbonari and Buonarrotti's secret societies of the day: 'Ours was not a sect, but a religion of patriotism. Sects may be extinguished by violence—religions never.'²⁰⁵ Stolzman argued that the qualities that were needed to lead a people in an insurrection were not based on wealth or property, but on a 'genuine love of the Motherland together with a sense of justice'.²⁰⁶ In contrasting the life of a mercenary with the life of a guerrilla volunteer, Carlo Bianco saw the volunteer as the 'Italian citizen who, animated by a sacred enthusiasm, freely dedicates his life and possessions to his country', who 'takes up arms to serve Italy', to play his part in the 'sublime purpose of her regeneration', who is 'imbued with the pure joy that gladdens the heart of one devoted to a good cause', who 'feels a love of humanity, and for what is just and true'.²⁰⁷

The nation had an almost interchangeable role with the *patrie* for these republicans, especially for Mazzini. As with Rousseau, both these entities needed to be created but also already had to exist: 'In order to found a nationality, it is necessary that the feeling and consciousness of a nationality should exist'.²⁰⁸ For Stolzman, both the nation and the *patrie* were born through military struggle: 'this war will give birth to strength, trust, and free education for the people', because 'struggle tempers nations, and rebellion wipes out the stigma of bondage from the rebels' brows'.²⁰⁹

At the end of the expedition named 'notre république ambulante' by Harro Harring, the four republicans went off on different trajectories, but all had determined a single course for the shape of sovereign republics and provided its military blueprint for much of the rest of the century.²¹⁰ Stolzman eventually found haven in England, was active in exile community politics organizing the next insurrection, and writing *Partisan War*. Mazzini went on to fulfil his brilliant future as symbol of the Italian nation, although Carlo Bianco had a less successful transition to the career of professional exile.²¹¹ Harro Harring continued to

²⁰⁵ *Life and Writings*, iii, 6.

²⁰⁶ *Partisan Warfare*, 5, 6, 8.

²⁰⁷ *Della Guerra Nazionale d'Insurrezione*, Discorso Preliminare, LXXXIX.

²⁰⁸ Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, i, 108.

²⁰⁹ *Partisan Warfare*, 20–1.

²¹⁰ 'Our movable republic', or more precisely, 'walking republic'. *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, i, 38.

²¹¹ Bianco, reduced to penury but refusing to accept commission in a professional army, eventually killed himself in Belgium in 1843. See Pieri's *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, 105.

wreak havoc on empire wherever and whenever he could for the next twenty-five years, in prison and out, founding newspapers and planning republican insurrections from Oslo to Latin America. What had brought them together was a desire for a modern, secular, vision of Europe constructed on democratic sovereign states that were above all republican; but most important was that they all displayed the willingness to fight for them.

The strength of this paradigm lay in the extent to which it developed its own trajectory, but, also in the sense in which it influenced other strands of republicanism, even some elements of pacifism. It is true that some pacifists were absolutely and unconditionally opposed to war. One of the arguments used by pacifist liberals was that nothing of permanent political value could come from military solutions;²¹² in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this disposition was perhaps best symbolized by Jean Jaurès.²¹³ However, closer examination shows that many republicans who were active anti-militarists remained strongly committed to defensive war throughout this period. This commitment is normally traced in France as a direct consequence of the experience of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1, but there is evidence of widespread support for defensive war among republicans during the 1850s and 1860s.²¹⁴ The French republican intellectual, Jules Barni, for example, is comfortably classed as one of the pre-eminent engineers of the large peace conferences of the 1860s, but a more detailed look at his views on war and peace reveals that he was in favour of intervention and defensive republican war. In his book *La Morale dans la démocratie* in 1868 Barni argued for a type of patriotism where 'each citizen has two outfits, one for his profession and the other for military life'; he also added that 'it is the intrinsic right of all human beings to resist by force those who wish to oppress them'.²¹⁵ The republican

²¹² See for example F. Passy, *Conférence sur la paix et la guerre* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1867), 36.

²¹³ Jean Jaurès argued a particular kind of socialist case against partisan and insurrectionary war—'ces armées d'improvisation et de catastrophe'. He argued that tactics had irrevocably changed, and presented the case for a total demilitarization of all political action, especially class politics: 'la tactique des peuples opprimés change aujourd'hui par la nature des choses, comme la tactique du prolétariat lui-même. Le prolétariat a renoncé à la guerre des rues.' He believed in focusing on international peace and was radically anti-colonial. *L'Armée nouvelle* (Paris: J. Rouff, 1911).

²¹⁴ As is comprehensively shown in Alice Conklin's *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997), France's republican tradition becomes purely defensive in Europe after 1870, but remains excessively expansive abroad.

²¹⁵ J. Barni, *La Morale dans la démocratie; suivi du manuel républicain* (Paris: Ed. Kimé, 1992), 165, 116.

philosopher Eugène Pelletan argued that the only war a republic could wage was a defensive one, as compared to the aggressive war of monarchies.²¹⁶ Garibaldi was even invited to attend the Geneva peace conference in 1867 where he announced (to loud acclaim): 'the slave alone has the right to wage war against tyrants'. This argument was embedded within a cluster of republican values: 'All nations are sisters. Wars between them are impossible. Democracy and the propagation of democracy by instruction, education and virtue. Only democracy can remedy the evil of war and reverse the lies of despotism.'²¹⁷

CONCLUSION

This chapter has advanced a number of claims concerning what has been termed the republican tradition of war. Both the expansive and defensive strands of the republican tradition shared a number of features. They came to life and were embedded in situations of wars of conquest, military occupation, and foreign rule. It was exclusively in such conditions that republicans such as Mazzini and Stolzman, Bianco and Harro Harring constructed their theories of popular sovereignty, the good life, and practices of insurrectionary war.

Much of the current study of republicanism tends to ignore the centrality of martial values in the construction of modern republics. By examining the historical practices of republicans in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is hoped that a broader account of the intellectual foundations of republicanism has emerged. Modern republicanism was not constructed merely within national boundaries (and by liberal nationalists). It expressed a vision of the human subject through the agency of republican patriotism rather than nationalism. And finally, war is often seen as destructive of social and civic identities, whereas it is possible to see its constructive—and even creative—character for the republicans who waged it. War was not, in other words, a means to achieving the good life of the peaceful republic, but the good life in itself.

Next, republican war can be seen to be intricately implicated in core republican principles. Accordingly, if freedom is to be understood as independence, and dependence as any kind of slavery, then one needs to find the means to avoid becoming dependent not only on tyrants who

²¹⁶ Eugène Pelletan, *La Tragédie italienne* (Paris: Pagnerre, 1862), 29.

²¹⁷ A. Campanella, 'Garibaldi and the First Peace Congress in Geneva in 1867', *International Review of Social History*, 5 (1960), 468–9.

arise (by means of faction) from within but also from without (by way of conquest). But if conquest ends liberty, and liberty is the basic value, then one needs to stand ready as a community to repel enslaving conquerors no less than tyrants. Just as this makes participation in civil government an aspect of the *virtù* needed to stop tyranny, so participation in a civic militia becomes part of the *virtù* required to stop conquest. This is also why the trajectory of republican war is essentially one about defensive wars, as can be seen by the arguments advanced at the various diplomatic conferences on the laws of war between 1874 and 1949.²¹⁸

This chapter has also shown that the republican tradition of war is truly something of a 'lost tribe', given that one of its principal founders, Rousseau, has been customarily aligned with the 'Romantic' tradition. This interpretation has typically placed Rousseau alongside Vico as part of an intellectual movement which developed in Germany in the writings of Herder, Fichte, and, ultimately, Hegel. This is a substantial misalignment, for which there are at least two reasons. The first is the usual emphasis on the rationality of the Enlightenment, with the 'Romantics' forming its heterodoxy. Hence the tendency either to interpret a violence-based morality as a dangerous type of radicalism (which could find its feet only in absolutist, totalitarian, and revolutionary models of thought), or to conflate heroic and epic narratives and practices with mysticism, nationalism, and quasi-religious or proto-Marxist doctrines. Both interpretations deny the genuineness of a moderate republicanism which was radical only in its activism, and was constructed in response to particular political predicaments in the modern European system of states (the experience of oppression, subjugation, and political domination). Second, some have argued that the kind of moral action upon which the republican tradition of war rested had fragmented by the end of the eighteenth century. As can be seen by a small sample of the rich literature of some of the members of Young Europe, Young Poland, and Italy, this is manifestly untrue.

Through affiliation with Pasquale Paoli and Tadeusz Kosciuszko, Rousseau can be seen and understood as (contrary to received wisdom among many theorists) one of the founders of a tradition of hope, rather than a tradition of despair. This hope is manifested in several dimensions. Their relentless unmasking of corrupt political structures provided the impetus for many republican blueprints for change; a positive appreciation of the essential goodness of man underlined the capacity for self-

²¹⁸ I am very grateful to Quentin Skinner for highlighting this aspect of my argument and for offering this extremely elegant formulation of it.

mastery and heroic action; and their calls for active citizen resistance to occupation and tyranny clearly represented a belief that such action was among the worthiest of human endeavours. At the same time this hope is not analogous to the Erasmian irenic tradition, especially as there is no teleological purpose which informs the actions of mankind—even those who are members of virtuous republics.

The final claim bears on Rousseau's contribution to the theories of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. It has been shown that his famous axiom on rights in war has been signally misinterpreted by virtually all subsequent writers and publicists. It was never his intention to limit the rights of belligerency to soldiers; rather, his two main purposes were to deny the very legitimacy of soldiers of conquest, and to protect citizens participating in the defence of their country from reprisals. It was true, as he said, that war was not between individuals, but it was most often between occupying armies and peoples. So Rousseau's practical advice on resisting foreign rule and occupation, coupled with Pasquale Paoli and Tadeusz Kosciuszko's epic acts, inspired and legitimized a vibrant, creative, and authentic body of writing on partisan and insurrectionary warfare across Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This literature and the numerous organized uprisings it codified were systematically buried by mainstream writers and publicists on the laws of war. This burial was perhaps explained by the eminently Grotian claim that any civilian involvement in belligerent acts jeopardized the entire project of introducing 'humanity in warfare'. This all-or-nothing argument denied the republican paradigm, which blended just war and justice in war, because its formulation would demand a radical change in Grotian thinking. At a deeper level, the argument over the distinction between combatant and non-combatant was rooted in conflicting notions of human nature and the good life. For the Grotians, the Hobbesian imperative of purchasing peace at any price—be it collaboration or even slavery—was natural to the condition of man. Occupation was therefore something to be endured, or at best observed from the (hopefully) distant spheres of private life. In the republican vision, occupation was an affront to both individual and collective freedom; it was a pervasive and invasive phenomenon from which no retrenchment was possible.